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INTRODUCTION
The US economy continues to evidence strength after a long upheaval; investment in US markets also continues to be strong. This refl ects, in part, the longstanding, underlying confi dence in US markets, which is enhanced through effective regulation, oversight and assurance. Independent audits of the fi nancial statements of public companies are a core contributor to this confi dence. Although clearly not a guarantee of investment performance (which is affected by many factors), the independent audit ' s overriding goal is to contribute to investor confi dence by providing reasonable assurance of the fair presentation of a company ' s fi nancial statements. Reasonable assurance is the level of assurance provided by an auditor and represents high but not absolute level of assurance.
1
The independent audit enhances confi dence by supplementing the roles played by the principal players who have varying responsibility for the fi nancial statements. Quite simply, management is responsible for the company ' s fi nancial statements, for maintaining effective internal control over fi nancial reporting, and for its assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over fi nancial reporting. The additional players with different but complementary responsibilities for the fi nancial statements include internal audit, 2 the audit committee and external audit. Think of these four principal players as a string quartet; each has a part to play that is unique and distinctive. Yet, when in tune, and in sync with one another, music is truly made. When each player performs at their own tempo, and not paying attention to one another, the result is noise. The four principal players each play their designated role and also act in concert to deliver reliable fi nancial statement information to investors.
The past several years have been a period of enormous change in the United States and global capital markets and for the public company audit profession. Almost 10 years before the most recent fi nancial crisis, Congress reaffi rmed the important role of the outside public company audit and expanded its scope under the aegis of a new regulatory regime. Since 2003, the independent oversight of the external audit profession has been conducted by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), the audit regulator that was created by the passage of the Sarbanes -Oxley Act of 2002. This Act expanded oversight of auditors by audit committees, called for stricter rules regarding auditor independence, more frequent partner rotation, and required registration, inspections and enforcement by the PCAOB. At the same time, Sarbanes -Oxley expanded the scope of the auditor ' s role beyond providing its report regarding reasonable assurance of the fair presentation of a company ' s fi nancial statements, to include also a report regarding the design and operating effectiveness of internal control over fi nancial reporting of larger public companies. Taken together, these changes provided a critical underpinning to restore investor confi dence that had been shaken by the scandals at the beginning of this century.
Such changes are consistent with reactions to previous scandal or upheaval, and similar to current reaction to the 2008 fi nancial crisis: calls for more regulation, more transparency in fi nancial reporting and increased focus on sound corporate governance. The public company audit profession has an important role to play in discussions aimed at fostering the integrity and reliability of fi nancial information. We also have a responsibility to the public to add our expertise to the dialogue, and to encourage standard setters to reinforce that fi nancial reporting practices keep pace with changing market realities.
THE INDEPENDENT AUDIT ' S VALUE: REINFORCING SHARED RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACCURATE FINANCIAL REPORTING
Many have recognized that a sustainable audit profession is critical to the integrity of our nation ' s capital markets and the strength of the US economy. By the very nature of the independent audit process, investors and markets benefi t from the fi nal product -the audit report -and from the audit process, which underlies that report. For example, management knows that the auditor cometh; this knowledge can bring greater internal discipline and some measure of pre-emptive deterrence of bad behavior. The very fact that an external audit is part of the fi nancial reporting process often engenders more care on the part of management.
The independent audit also reinforces the interplay among three of the four playerssecond violin, viola and cello, in fact, the audit committee, internal audit and the external audit -that complement management ' s role as lead violin with primary responsibility to ensure fair and accurate fi nancial reporting. Although each player has his or her own notes to play, the notion of shared responsibility to make music in concert resonates as does a complementary duty to the investing public in the fi nancial reporting process.
The investing public, as shareholders, elect a company ' s board of directors. The board then appoints the audit committee, which often oversees internal audit, and selects and hires the independent auditors. Frequently, shareholders then ratify the auditor selection. The board also oversees management through the governance process.
Ideally, this complementary duty to the investor-owners of the company fosters collaboration and heightens awareness of the respective responsibilities of the principal players. This means that each should understand and execute its respective role. Think of the extreme example: an independent audit fi rm diligently performs its professional responsibilities while the other three principals do not. How effective would an independent audit be if management was worried only about maximizing its compensation? If the internal auditor saw no duty other than to search for operating effi ciencies? If the audit committee focused its attention solely on reducing audit fees? The answer is: not effective at all -the failed attempt caused by working at cross purposes yields cacophony or no music at all. Although hypothetical, this is the kind of client that a prudent audit fi rm would most likely walk away from. The risks would simply be too great and the likelihood of joint execution of the complementary duty to investors too low.
To fully understand the respective responsibilities among the principal players requires fully understanding how their roles complement management ' s overall responsibility for the fi nancial statements.
Role of management
Management is responsible for the operations of the company and for managing all of its business risks, as well as setting the organization ' s tone at the top, which drives culture, integrity and ethics. As a part of this responsibility, management has the obligation to design, implement and ensure effective operation of a system of internal control over fi nancial reporting. Ultimately management has primary responsibility for the company ' s fi nancial statements to inform investors and the public about the company ' s fi nancial position and the results of its operations during each period. For public companies, management also explains its fi nancial results through management ' s discussion and analysis as part of its annual and quarterly fi lings.
Role of internal audit
Throughout the year, internal auditors execute a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate certain areas, which may include the effectiveness of risk management, effectiveness of controls, effi ciency of operations and governance processes. The most effective internal audit groups provide objective assurance and information to the board, audit committee and management that, among other things, the company is in compliance with its own policies and procedures. Although the internal audit function is part of the company, those who observe the standards of the Institute of Internal Auditors have a duty to act independently and objectively when performing their work, and must have an impartial, unbiased attitude and avoid any confl ict of interest.
Role of the audit committee
The audit committee is responsible for ensuring that governance practices set an appropriate tone, and it oversees management ' s implementation of policies that foster ethical behavior. The audit committee also has governance oversight responsibility in the fi nancial reporting process, and has the sole authority to hire, compensate and fi re the independent auditor.
Role of the independent auditor
The independent auditor has the responsibility to plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the fi nancial statements are free from material misstatement. Understanding ' how and why an independent audit matters ' , requires some understanding of the extensive processes that underlie an audit report, because much of the value of what an auditor does is not generally seen or broadly understood.
The external auditor ' s responsibility is to express an opinion on the company ' s fi nancial statements and an opinion on the company ' s internal control over fi nancial reporting. These reports are the auditor ' s only ' product ' . Understanding the audit process itself helps elucidate the value of the end product. The independent audit process begins even before the auditor accepts an engagement with a prospective client. Before accepting an engagement, the audit fi rm will make a preliminary assessment of the potential risks, the nature and complexity of the prospective client ' s business and whether the audit fi rm has the resources and expertise to perform the audit. The reputation and integrity of management and the audit committee are a threshold issue in client acceptance and, while not widely known, most major audit fi rms typically perform detailed background checks on senior management and the audit committee as part of client acceptance procedures. Although not required by professional standards, background checks serve to mitigate the risk of accepting a client whose principals are people with whom the fi rm would not want to associate.
If, after this assessment the auditor decides to accept the client and the client audit committee decides to hire the independent audit fi rm, the audit team spends signifi cant time with the audit committee and company management. The team then constructs an audit plan based on an understanding of the company ' s business risks and its controls to mitigate such risks, with a focus on the likelihood of any material misstatements in the company ' s fi nancial statements (that is, ' what could go wrong ' in the fi nancial reporting process). The auditor undertakes many steps to understand the company ' s business and its industry in order to identify the risks of material misstatement and to plan and scope the audit. These steps include reviewing information such as the public record, past company reports, industry and competitor analysis and benchmarking, and information from outside analysts. Steps also include consideration of new types of transactions, identifi cation of unusual or signifi cant transactions as well as consideration of past history of fi nancial misstatements. This review typically takes place each year in response to constantly changing business conditions and company-specifi c factors.
On the basis of the planning and risk assessment process described above, even in advance of the ' what could go wrong ' risk analysis, auditors also determine the company ' s significant accounts and the type of transactions it is involved in to determine what audit procedures to perform, what evidence is needed and how to assign audit resources. The preparation of an audit plan helps auditors identify areas of potential vulnerability for fraud that require added audit attention. As specifi ed by the PCAOB ' s interim auditing standards, ' An auditor has a responsibility to plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the fi nancial statements are free of material misstatement, whether caused by error or fraud ' . 3 In addition to auditing the fi nancial statements, the external auditors also assess the effectiveness of a company ' s internal control over fi nancial reporting -the process designed and implemented by the company ' s management to address the risk of material errors and misstatements in fi nancial statements. In reviewing management ' s process, the auditor considers whether the company has established effective procedures to reduce the risk of errors or fraud. In designing the audit, the auditor will have considered whether certain areas might require special scrutiny.
Auditors then examine, on a test basis, evidence supporting transactions, controls and related data and, based on judgments, draw conclusions from the audit evidence obtained. As, in most cases, auditors do not examine every transaction, control and event, there is no guarantee that all material misstatements, whether caused by error or fraud, will be detected. Instead, the audit is designed to provide reasonable assurance , which, as described in professional standards, is a high level of assurance but not absolute. Absolute assurance from the audit is, practically speaking, impossible: Auditors cannot test 100 per cent, or, in most cases, even a majority of transactions; there simply is not enough time and it would be prohibitively expensive. This is why the string quartet is very important -the independent audit is an important part of the score, but each principal player must do its part for the music to please the audience.
THE VALUE OF THE INDEPENDENT AUDIT: PROFESSIONAL SKEPTICS AND KNOWLEDGEABLE ADVISORS
Users of the audit report, the sole product representing our responsibility to express an opinion on the company ' s fi nancial statements and internal control over fi nancial reporting, often do not see or fully appreciate the extensive, independent audit process: that an audit typically involves a detailed series of discussions with clients on complex and signifi cant matters. These discussions, or more accurately, consultations, are an integral part of the give and take between auditor and client management. In a given year an audit fi rm may say ' no ' to its portfolio of client companies hundreds of times. This reality is not understood or seen by investors, but it is part and parcel of how auditors deliver value to improve fi nancial reporting. Given the speed, volume and complexity of fi nancial reporting issues today, fi nancial management and audit committees seek an auditor ' s professional expertise to, for example, confi rm that a proposed accounting treatment or an accounting policy issue is fully vetted before preparation of the related fi nancial statements. The practice of exploring, in advance, the appropriate accounting for a complex transaction with the auditor is usually done in a constructive, collaborative manner; nonetheless, it is not unusual for the independent auditor ' s input to lead to signifi cant changes in a client company ' s proposed approach. When that occurs, the independent auditor is in a position to draw the line when it needs to be drawn. And we do.
Also of value is that the audit committee, the entire board and management have a knowledgeable advisor, an expert on fi nancial reporting, to help them better understand increasingly complex fi nancial reporting regimes -to explain how standards have changed, how requirements have evolved and what may further increase the value to investors in reporting. Similar to management and other company offi cials, external auditors are professionally bound to stay abreast of developments in regulations and standards; and in many cases they are in a position to anticipate issues and identify leading practices because of their unique view across industries and sectors.
Yet, it is more than just the auditor ' s technical accounting and auditing skills that earn management and the audit committee confidence. By acting as the professional skeptic, investigating, researching and, when necessary, throwing up yellow caution lights and stop signs along the road, a good auditor builds a strong foundation of trust with management and the audit committee. Professional skepticism is fundamental to an auditor ' s objectivity and includes a questioning mind and an objective assessment of audit evidence. The auditor uses the knowledge, skill and ability called for by the profession of public accounting to diligently perform, in good faith and with integrity, the gathering and objective evaluation of audit evidence. The auditor is required by professional standards ' to exercise due professional care in the planning and performance of the audit and in the preparation of the auditor ' s report. Due professional care requires the auditor to exercise professional skepticism, which can be best defi ned as an attitude that includes a questioning mind and working practices that encompass a critical assessment of audit evidence. As evidence is gathered and evaluated throughout the audit, professional skepticism should be exercised throughout the entire audit process ' . 4 The importance of the auditor ' s exercise of professional skepticism manifests itself in several ways. The list of unadjusted errors for discussion with the audit committee is shorter; there are fewer instances of fraud; and when it does occur, it is apt to be detected sooner.
An example of this dual role as professional skeptic and knowledgeable advisor can serve as an illustration. A client company is in the throes of determining exactly how to implement a new accounting standard that could have a dramatic impact on its fi nancial statements. As is typical with a new standard, implementation guidance is scarce, and the company has developed an approach that would minimize the fi nancial statement impact. The company reviews its plan with the auditor, but the audit fi rm believes that the company ' s plan is outside the bounds of reasonable approaches. The auditor, as professional skeptic, applies the brakes. Then, through a collaborative process, the company and the auditor review several other approaches, discuss the auditor ' s experience with what other clients are doing, and what standard setters and regulators are saying in discussions about implementation. The auditor, as a knowledgeable advisor, assists the company in evaluating the alternatives, all the while observing the independence rules that prohibit the auditor from performing a management function. The company adjusts its implementation plan to an approach, which the auditor will support. Through the course of these consultations, the auditor has acted as a professional skeptic, and acted as a knowledgeable advisor to management, resulting in a conclusion that better informs investors.
There is a great deal behind the audit process that results in the fi nal product representing the auditor ' s responsibility to express an opinion on the company ' s fi nancial statements and internal control over fi nancial reporting; a thorough process and a series of frank consultations benefi t the company and yield better information for investors.
INCREASING COMPLEXITY AND AUDIT RELEVANCE
The increased challenges, issues and risks faced by management are all emblematic of the overall greater complexity faced by boards, investors and independent auditors. Recent years have seen enormous change in the United States and global capital markets, and changes, as summarized above, in the public company audit profession. The globalization of businesses has had a profound impact on, and dramatically increased the complexity of, public company auditing.
Within just the United States, the pace of new requirements and standards has increased. At the end of 1984, 25 plus years ago, the landscape for accounting, auditing and the public company auditing profession looked entirely different than it does today. This timeframe provides a good benchmark because, in 1984, the United States was facing a different fi nancial crisis; then, it was the beginning of widespread failure of savings and loan institutions. At the time, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) had issued 82 FASB statements. More recently, before the FASB Accounting Standards Codifi cation , the FASB had issued 168 statements and a ' vast volume of formal and informal accounting standards, regulations, and interpretations ' .
5 Although the codifi cation organizes all of the literature related to a particular accounting topic in one place, it has not slowed the pace at which new guidance is issued. Since the release of the codifi cation, the FASB has issued 35 Accounting Standards Updates. Currently, the FASB, jointly with the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), is deliberating a number of projects that will signifi cantly change fi nancial reporting and the overall presentation of fi nancial statementsall by 2011.
The International Accounting Standards Committee, the predecessor to the IASB, was only 11 years old in 1984 and really just getting started. Today, the international regime known as International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), as promulgated by the IASB, is used in well over 100 countries, with more countries slated to adopt over the next few years. In addition, the debate over the convergence of US standards (known as GAAP) and IFRS continues.
The combination of new standards and everevolving requirements, including accelerating fi ling deadlines for the largest companies, along with increasingly global markets, has required the audit profession to also evolve and change in order to serve investors and the capital markets. All of this increased complexity even further emphasizes the need for a quality independent audit based on extensive technical accounting and audit expertise.
Adding to the complexity for investors are a whole host of new infl uences and pressures on fi nancial reporting. Today, more than ever, there is greater media coverage and commentary on business practices and fi nancial reporting issues. Although the increased transparency that can result from this can be very benefi cial, it can also be confusing to investors. This has caused some to consider the relevance and value of the fi nancial reporting model, raising questions about how the model may need to change in the future to provide increased clarity. And the external audit itself is not exempt from challenge. Does it need to change? If so, in what ways?
One way to think about the independent audit is to imagine what the world would be like without it. Some would say, ' Great, we can save the cost and use the resources somewhere else! ' Others would say that managements are responsible enough to ensure that companies would do a careful, credible job of preparing accurate and transparent fi nancial statements, because the risks associated with not doing so are enough to deter any inappropriate behavior. In addition, it might just work -for a while. Over time, however, it is plausible to assume that the quality of fi nancial reporting would decline. Without the discipline of an independent audit, without the professional skeptic on the scene, without ready access to an objective and a knowledgeable advisor, how could we expect results to remain the same? Investor representatives have reinforced that they value what an independent audit contributes to the effi ciency of fi nancial reporting.
CONCLUSION
In answering the question ' how and why an independent audit matters ' , we have considered the explicit value of the fi nal audit report and the importance of the consultative audit process. In addition, we have highlighted the fact that the principal players each have a responsibility in the fi nancial reporting and governance regime; that complementary interplay and responsibility to the investing public is essential to help promote investor confi dence through reliable fi nancial statement information. Much like a string quartet, each player has a unique and distinctive part to play, and when in sync with one another music is truly made.
Financial reporting must continue to evolve to meet the needs of fi nancial markets in the new world, whether that includes movement toward more real-time reporting with ever changing technology or toward more principles-based standards. Independent auditors have and will continue to focus on improving performance essential to effectively execute quality audits that contribute to the reliability of timelier, more useful fi nancial information.
In addition, it is essential that auditors continue to be positioned to provide assurance on fi nancial reporting, in any format. As we move toward a set of global standards (accounting, auditing and independence), the value of the independent audit will continue to increase in infl uence as an element of effi ciently functioning global capital markets affecting investors around the world.
Everyday, this fact of globally interconnected markets is inextricably reinforced. This has turned attention more immediately to the move to one set of high quality global standards (IFRS) to facilitate global trust, and is expected to further enhance the auditor ' s importance in the fi nancial reporting process. The time may be near where extensive consideration is given to reviewing the scope and predictive value of the independent audit report.
The audit profession continues to face multiple, complex challenges. Investors and markets rely on the ability of the profession to overcome them. As it has in the past, the profession will do so -meeting not only the known challenges, but also the unknown as they unfold. 
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